The year 2024 was filled with challenging and difficult events for Iranian journalists and media outlets. This year saw historic events in Iran and the Middle East that significantly impacted the disruption of free information in the country. Simultaneously, the Islamic Republic of Iran developed patterns of suppressing freedom of expression; judicial and security actions against journalists and media continued unabated, and transnational threats against Iranian journalists took on alarming dimensions.
The Defending Free Flow Of Information Organization (DeFFI) prepared its annual report on the suppression of journalists and media in Iran based on 344 documented cases by the organization’s researchers. In 2024, DeFFI managed to increase its share of the total first-hand reports published on press repression in Iran to 32%.
In 2024:
- At least 256 journalists and media outlets experienced 385 cases of judicial and security action by the Islamic Republic
- Prison sentences against 11 journalists were enforced
- At least 36 journalists and media activists were arrested
- A total of 69 years and 10 months of prison sentences, 110 lashes, and over 200 million tomans in fines were imposed against journalists and media activists
- “Dissemination of falsehoods” was the most frequently attributed charge against journalists and media, occurring 205 times
- Judicial and security bodies violated the legal rights of journalists and media in at least 410 cases

The Significant Relationship Between Political Events and Patterns of Suppression of Freedom of Expression in Iran
In 2024, the statistics for judicial and security actions against journalists and media visibly increased in several months. The upward trend in media repression demonstrated a significant relationship with important social events in Iran.
In 2024, journalists, media, and Iranian users on social media experienced six waves of repression, all of which were initiated immediately following a significant political event. Events such as the attack on the commemoration ceremony of Qasem Soleimani in Kerman, the release of a BBC World report on the killing of “Nika Shakarami,” the ambiguous death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and reciprocal attacks between Iran and Israel activated the judiciary and security mechanisms of the Islamic Republic to suppress journalists, media, and social media users.
However, the death of Ebrahim Raisi, the former president, in the helicopter crash marked the beginning of the most extensive ongoing repression of media and journalists in 2024; a process that continued until the second round of presidential elections in Iran.

With the onset of each of the six waves of media and journalist repression in Iran, the Islamic Republic, with the help of state media, quasi-media, and media activists linked to government institutions and pro-regime supporters on social media, organized extensive campaigns to disseminate fake and misleading news reports; campaigns aimed at preventing independent narratives from challenging the official narrative or lessening the impact of independent stories.
The security, judicial, and propaganda bodies of the Islamic Republic sought to prevent independent narratives from becoming the dominant narrative among citizens following significant and socially provocative events. At the same time, the Iranian government heavily invested in its propaganda apparatus in an effort to impose official narratives on public opinion. Security and judicial actions against media, journalists, and disseminators of non-independent narratives were attempts to prevent the widespread publication of these narratives, delegitimize independent voices, and, in some cases, generate multiple parallel narratives. This trend was the most recurrent pattern of suppressing free information in Iran.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is also gradually implementing an interconnected system of media and quasi-media for executing its propaganda policies; a system that, alongside state broadcaster IRIB, newspapers, news websites, and media activists close to the government, includes tens of thousands of Telegram channels, Instagram pages, and Twitter accounts.
In 2024, the Islamic Republic expanded patterns of suppressing freedom of expression in the country alarmingly. A significant portion of the reactions from the Iranian judiciary, security, and government institutions to social events followed pre-designed models. The repetition of these suppression patterns in similar events, along with modifications to some of these patterns—especially in response to social events and media and human rights activities by dissenters—demonstrated that the mechanisms for suppressing free information in Iran are organized, and these protocols are continuously updated.
In 2024, some patterns of media and journalist repression, previously employed by Iranian security and judicial institutions in similar events, were repeated with minor changes. Concurrently with the repeating patterns of repression against social media users, DeFFI’s investigations indicated that security and judicial bodies increasingly resorted to threatening phone calls instead of issuing summons, filing cases, or detaining journalists.
Nevertheless, the prosecution of media outlets and journalists by prosecutors constituted one of the most frequent patterns of suppressing freedom of expression in 2024; a pattern that was reproduced immediately following significant social events to prevent challenges to the official narrative.
The speeches of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and his directive to “deal” with journalists, media, and social media users played a significant role in intensifying the suppression of freedom of expression in 2024.
In this year, at least two times after speeches by Ali Khamenei, a new wave of repression against journalists, analysts, and media began. In December 2024, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the Supreme Leader interpreted critical analyses of the Islamic Republic’s regional policies as “disheartening the people” and labeled critical analysts and journalists as “ignorant.” In October 2024, Khamenei once again issued orders to confront journalists and media using the key phrase “disruption of public psychological security,” a term he had previously used at least twice for similar purposes.
Additionally, investigations by the Defense for Free Information Organization revealed that in 2024, the Islamic Republic unlawfully cut off the SIM cards of several journalists and political activists due to their reporting on various events or their critical posts on social media—without any judicial orders. At the same time, several journalists and media activists, under pressure from security and judicial entities, were forced to delete their posts; these unlawful actions indicated that the Islamic Republic was developing patterns of suppressing free information in Iran.
Numerous interviews conducted by DeFFI with Iranian journalists and media managers suggest that targeted judicial and security actions in Iran have led to widespread self-censorship among journalists and media outlets. Many media activists refrain from expressing their opinions and sharing information due to fears of judicial and security reprisals.
This situation illustrates that the suppression of freedom of expression and the disruption of free information in Iran have complex and multilayered dimensions. In Iran, a significant amount of information is monopolized by state entities, many citizens are deprived of access to accurate and timely information, and numerous events lead to ambiguity and confusion among citizens, making it challenging for society to analyze realities and make informed decisions. Such conditions are primarily the result of organized disruption of free information in Iran.
Unprecedented Suppression of Female Journalists
In 2024, female journalists experienced an unprecedented level of repression in Iran. For several consecutive months this year, the number of women journalists imprisoned for their professional duties exceeded that of male journalists. Among the heaviest prison sentences issued in 2024, three women each received five years in prison, ranking from second to fourth among the five highest sentences.
In 2024, at least 40 female journalists faced judicial and security actions by the Islamic Republic. This year, at least 18 new judicial cases were filed against female journalists, six women were arrested, prison sentences against five female journalists were enforced, and at least eight other women experienced summons to judicial and security entities, job terminations, threats, or confiscation of personal belongings due to their professional duties.
In the courts held in 2024, 17 female journalists in separate cases were sentenced to a total of 23 years and 9 months in prison, over 68 million tomans in fines, four years of exile, eight years of prohibition from practicing journalism, 12 years of prohibition from social media activities, and four years of exit prohibition.
Among the sentences issued against female journalists, “Shirin Saeidi,” “Elaheh Mohammadi,” and “Niloufar Hamedi” each received the heaviest enforceable prison sentences of five years.
Of the 17 judgments issued in 2024 against female journalists, 12 cases involved the publication of reports or tweets related to women’s issues.
In the last days of 2024, the security agencies of the Islamic Republic arrested “Cecilia Sala,” an Italian journalist who had traveled to the country on a journalistic visa. Following her arrest, she was transferred to solitary confinement in Ward 209 of Evin Prison, deprived of minimum humane living conditions, and her meetings and phone communications with her relatives were restricted.
Intensification of the News Desert in Iran: Suppression of Journalists and Media Outside the Capital
In 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran, relying on extensive judicial and security actions, widely and alarmingly violated the freedom of expression rights of journalists residing in provinces far from the center. The suppression of media, journalists, and citizen journalists in Iran was systematically and intentionally carried out; a situation that directly paved the way for the ruthless suppression of minority citizens in Iran, leaving a profound and significant impact on ethnic minorities—including Turks, Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, and other ethnic groups—and exacerbating the concerning conditions of the “news desert” in Iran. The term “news desert” refers to the severe shortage of independent and credible news sources.
Statistics from the Defending Free Flow Of Information Organization indicate the “Tehranization” of media in Iran. The disproportionate investment and concentration of media in Tehran reflect in the statistics of judicial and security actions as well. Over the past year, at least 256 journalists and media experienced 385 cases of judicial and security actions by the Islamic Republic. More than 63% of these actions were enforced against journalists and media in Tehran Province.
This year, judicial and security actions by the Islamic Republic against journalists and media were recorded in all provinces of Iran. After Tehran Province, journalists and media in Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Hormozgan, West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Zanjan, Kermanshah, and Gilan experienced the highest number of judicial and security actions.

In 2024, at least 67 media outlets and journalists in provinces outside Tehran—including 12 women, 48 men, and seven media outlets—experienced 92 instances of judicial and security actions by the Islamic Republic.
From the beginning of 2024 until the end of that year, 20 journalists belonging to ethnic minorities experienced temporary detention, 14 journalists were summoned to judicial or security entities, 23 new cases were filed against media and journalists outside the capital, security and judicial bodies or groups affiliated with the government disrupted professional activities in seven cases, and three journalists were deprived of their legal rights in prison.
During this period, the judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran issued judicial rulings against 19 journalists and media managers from ethnic minorities. Applying Article 134 of the Islamic Penal Code and taking into account the last ruling in each case, these journalists were collectively sentenced to 9 years, 10 months, and 17 days in prison, received 110 lashes, incurred fines of 19 million and 600 thousand tomans, faced two years of exile, two years of exit prohibition, and two years of restriction from activities on social media.
Issuance of Unlawful Verdicts Against Journalists and Repeated Violations of Media Rights
Based on the findings of this report, in 2024, political and press courts systematically refused to address parts of the cases of media outlets and journalists, contrary to press law, with these cases primarily being referred for trial to criminal and revolutionary courts.
During this year, criticism of the inefficacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran or the publication of reports on corruption within state institutions and officials was the most frequent subject that journalists and media faced judicial and security actions after addressing. Publishing reports or posts on social media criticizing the Islamic Republic’s international and regional policies, reactions to the death of Ebrahim Raisi, issues related to presidential elections, women’s rights and compulsory hijab, condemnation of the crackdown on protesting citizens, and environmental matters were among other instances leading to judicial cases and security actions against journalists and media in 2024.
In this year, at least 114 judicial cases were filed against journalists and media, and press courts issued indictments in at least 55 cases. In the rulings issued this year, at least 33 journalists and media activists—applying Article 134 of the Islamic Penal Code and taking into account the last ruling issued in each case—were sentenced to a total of 69 years and 10 months in prison, received 110 lashes, incurred fines exceeding 200 million tomans, faced four years of exile, six years of exit prohibition, six years of prohibition from practicing journalism, and eight years of inactivity on social media.
In 2024, judicial and security entities violated the legal rights of journalists and media under prosecution in at least 410 instances.

This year, holding press trials in a non-public manner was the most frequent violation by the judiciary of the Islamic Republic. According to Article 168 of the Constitution and Article 34 of the Revised Press Law of 2000, press trials should be public and conducted with the presence of a jury.
The lack of access for journalists to selected lawyers, threats, harassment, and disruption of journalists’ and media’s professional activities, conducting press trials without a jury, arbitrary arrests of journalists and media activists, depriving imprisoned or detained journalists of visits and phone calls with family, confiscation of equipment or personal property of journalists without judicial orders, psychological torture of detainees, physical assault on journalists by judicial agents or individuals affiliated with state and security institutions, and the closure of media outlets were other violations by judicial and security bodies against journalists and media that faced prosecution in 2024.

“Dissemination of falsehoods aimed at disturbing public opinion” was the most frequently attributed charge against journalists and media in 2024; an accusation with unlawful precedents that the Islamic Republic targeted to systematically undermine the credibility of independent reporting in the country.
The findings of this report revealed that in 2024, judicial and security entities repeatedly used charges and filed similar cases to delineate and emphasize the unacceptable limits of the Islamic Republic concerning the boundaries and topics published by media professionals. The judiciary of the Islamic Republic also sought, through filing consecutive cases against media outlets and their responsible managers, to compel media to self-censor and remain inactive to avoid further costs and potential closures, while indirectly turning the managers of media organizations into tools of pressure on journalists.