September 2024, proved to be a challenging month for journalists and advocates of freedom of expression in Iran. Coinciding with the second anniversary of the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests, organized disruption of free information continued, widespread restrictions against media outlets and journalists were reiterated, and the Islamic Republic expanded its patterns of suppressing freedom of expression.
September also marked the second month of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency. Similar to the previous month, this month was characterized by the arrest of journalists, the issuance of prison sentences against them, and targeted disruptions of journalists’ professional activities.
The Defending Free Flow of Information (DeFFI) prepared its September report based on 20 newly documented cases by the organization’s researchers and a total of 31 updated cases. Based on these press cases, judicial and security confrontations with journalists increased by 30% compared to the previous month.
In this month, at least 24 journalists and media outlets experienced judicial and security actions by the Islamic Republic in 28 separate cases, with authorities violating the legal rights of journalists and Iranian media in at least 25 instances.
In September, several methods of disrupting the professional activities of journalists—which had previously been used in limited cases by the Islamic Republic’s security and judicial authorities—were repeated more frequently. Investigations by the Defending Free Flow of Information revealed that the security agencies of the Islamic Republic unlawfully cut off the SIM cards of several journalists and political activists due to their reporting on various events or for posting critical content on social media. an unlawful action that demonstrated the Islamic Republic’s development of patterns for suppressing free information in Iran.
September 2024 began with the continued imprisonment of at least nine journalists and media activists in Iranian prisons. Vida Rabani, Shirin Saeedi, Nasrin Hosseini, Parisa Salehi, Saba Azarpayk, Kamiar Fakoor, Rouhollah Nakhaei, Foad Sadeghi, and Yashar Soltani started this month in prison. In the early days of this month, Saeedeh Shafiee’s prison sentence was executed—despite her illness—bringing the number of imprisoned journalists and media activists in Iran to ten.
In mid-September, Parisa Salehi was released from Kachoui Prison after completing her five-month sentence. By the end of this month, however, the judiciary released Yashar Soltani after he had served nearly four months in Tehran’s Big Prison. Meanwhile, Fatemeh Gholipour in Tabriz and Fardin Mostafayi in Saqez experienced temporary detention. Ultimately, September ended with the continued imprisonment of at least eight journalists and media activists.
Suppression of the Press During the Second Month of Masoud Pezeshkian’s Presidency
September coincided with the second month of Masoud Pezeshkian’s official presidency. Similar to the previous month, the suppression of journalists and media continued unabated, with no improvement in press freedom indicators, and judicial and security actions against journalists and media increased by about 30% compared to the prior month.
Despite nearly two months having passed since Masoud Pezeshkian’s directive to withdraw complaints from governmental entities against journalists and media, numerous government officials and entities ignored the President’s order and filed new complaints against media outlets and journalists. In September, at least nine new cases were initiated against Iranian journalists and media activists.
In mid-September, Masoud Pezeshkian held his first press conference since assuming the presidency of Iran. During this event, Maryam Shabani, a reporter for Andisheh Pouya magazine, criticized the presence of morality police on the streets of Iran, stating that she had to sneak through “back alleys” to reach the press conference due to concerns about facing hijab officers. Maryam Shabani’s criticism sparked widespread reactions on social media and among Islamic Republic officials. The day after, Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, the head of the Supreme Court, threatened this journalist with “consequences.”
The imposition of restrictions and disruptions in the professional activities of Iranian journalists by governmental entities continued in September. In the early days of the month, a reporter and cameraman from the Rokna news agency were unprofessionally and disrespectfully removed from a meeting with Hossein Simayi, the Minister of Science, despite having initially received an invitation to attend.
A few days earlier, after the controversial presence of Mohammad Reza Aref’s son at the introduction meeting for the Minister of Industry, several journalists had reported via social media posts that the introduction ceremony for the Minister of Communications was held without the presence of journalists. They wrote that the exclusion of journalists from the meeting was carried out at the behest of Mohammad Reza Aref.
The Meaningful Relationship Between Important Social Events and Press Suppression in Iran
In September 2024, the judicial and security confrontations with Iranian journalists and media showed a significant correlation with important social events. September coincided with the second anniversary of the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests, and in the middle of the month, explosions targeting Hezbollah’s forces in Lebanon marked the beginning of historic events in the Middle East. In the final days of September, an explosion in the Maadanjo coal mine in Tabas resulted in the deadliest labor accident in the history of Iranian mines.
These three provocative events—similar to past significant social events—reactivated the judiciary and security mechanisms of the Islamic Republic against journalists and media outlets, intensified the suppression of freedom of expression in the country, and made independent information dissemination even more challenging.
As the second anniversary of the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests approached, which began in 2022 following the death of “Mahsa (Jina) Amini” in the custody of the morality police, some patterns of press suppression in Iran changed compared to the same time last year.
During the second anniversary of “Jina’s” protests, the judiciary, security, and governmental bodies of the Islamic Republic focused their efforts on exerting pressure on media leaders and policymakers to prevent the publication of reports regarding these events and disrupt independent information dissemination. In contrast to the previous year when journalists experienced more threatening phone calls, summons to judicial authorities, and temporary detentions.
In the last days of September, the explosion in the Maadanjo coal mine resulted in the deaths of at least 52 workers. Immediately following this event, which was the deadliest labor accident in the recorded history of Iranian mines, the judiciary, security, and governmental entities of the Islamic Republic exerted their full capacity to disrupt accurate information dissemination and prevent the narrative of this tragic incident from being widely shared.
For days, as contradictory reports circulated about the number of miners who died in the Maadanjo coal mine, police and security forces present at the scene obstructed journalists from entering the mine site, mine managers refused to respond to media inquiries, many provincial and national officials were prohibited from speaking with the press regarding this incident, and after a week, the Attorney General of Iran stated: “We must wait for the investigator’s statement” and declared any commentary on this event prohibited.
From the very first hours following the incident at the Tabas mine, officials from the Masoud Pezeshkian administration, through the institution’s information council and in collaboration with the judiciary and security agencies of the Islamic Republic, attempted to present a false narrative of the event to absolve the government and regulatory bodies of responsibility for this tragic occurrence.
After the explosion at the Tabas coal mine, similar to several other significant and provocative events in the past, the security, judiciary, and propaganda entities of the Islamic Republic sought to amplify the official narrative of the regime and prevent independent narratives from becoming the dominant discourse among citizens.
Continuing Issuance of Extralegal Judgments Against Journalists and Media
According to the documented cases by the Defending Free Flow of Information, in September, political and press courts, or judges from the judiciary, issued indictment orders against journalists and media outlets in at least ten cases or imposed prison sentences on them.
In this month, Mahta Sadri, a journalist for the “Gilan Sadr” news website, was sentenced to six million tomans in fines in lieu of six months’ imprisonment. The prison sentence of Saeedeh Shafiee, which had previously been suspended due to her illness, was executed despite her deteriorating health and need for ongoing treatment. In the final days of this month, Mostafa Nasri, a journalist and economic analyst, was summoned to Evin’s execution office to serve his sentence of three years and four months in prison.
Similar to previous months, in September, “spreading falsehoods with the intent to disturb public opinion,” as per Article 746 of the Islamic Penal Code, with 16 instances, and “propaganda against the regime,” according to Article 500 of the Islamic Penal Code, with four instances, were again the most frequently attributed charges against journalists and media outlets in press-related cases.