This report is a study on the status of press freedom indicators during the first 100 days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency. The Defending Free Flow of Information (DeFFI) compiled this report by examining and documenting 81 press cases from the time of the “inauguration” ceremony on July 28, 2024, to the end of the hundredth day of Masoud Pezeshkian’s officially assumed presidency on November 4, 2024.
The findings of this report were formulated based on interviews conducted by DeFFI researchers with informed sources, the collection and verification of legal documents, reports published in partner media, statements from officials and state media, and the statistical analysis of the gathered data.
The statistics and recorded events in this report only include data that the Defending Free Flow of Information was able to collect, verify, and document. Due to the multilayered mechanisms of repression in Iran, it is likely that the violations of the rights of media outlets, journalists, and citizen journalists exceed the statistics and events documented in this report.
Based on the findings of this report, in the first 100 days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency, not only was there no significant change in the indicators of press freedom in Iran, but organized disruptions to free information continued, patterns of suppressing freedom of expression were expanded, and 78 media outlets and journalists experienced judicial and security confrontations by the Islamic Republic.
Relationship Between Important Social Events and Press Suppression in Iran
On Friday, July 5, the second round of presidential elections was held in Iran. The Ministry of the Interior announced the official voter turnout for eligible citizens to be 49 percent, and Masoud Pezeshkian was declared the winning candidate. This election recorded one of the lowest participation rates in the history of elections in Iran.
Following the official announcement of the election results, Masoud Pezeshkian, contrary to the usual practice of other elected officials, canceled his press conference with media outlets and instead went to meet with Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In an unprecedented move, Pezeshkian’s first interview as the new president was delayed for about two months. He conducted his first interview with state television (IRIB) without the presence of independent journalists and media outlets.
Theauguration ceremony for Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency took place on Sunday, July 28. Two days later, his “swearing-in” ceremony was held in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Less than three days after the official start of Pezeshkian’s presidency, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, who had traveled to Iran to attend the swearing-in ceremony, was killed at his residence in Tehran.
Thisated the military confrontation between Iran and Israel to a new level, reaching a point of no return. The military conflict between Iran and Israel accounted for the largest volume of news production by Iranian media and journalists by the end of the hundredth day of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency, simultaneously becoming the most influential factor in exacerbating disruptions to the free flow of information in Iran.
The Islamic Republic’s reaction to the assassination of the head of Hamas’s political bureau in Tehran once again followed patterns that had been previously repeated in other significant events. Information dissemination by media outlets and responsible officials was carried out without details and carried a theme of threats for retaliation against Israel.
Hours after the assassination of the head of Hamas’s political bureau, the Attorney General of Iran threatened Iranian citizens and media activists who reacted to the event with judicial and security actions. The key phrase used in the prosecutor’s statement referred to dealing with “disturbances to the psychological security of society”; a phrase that had previously been used at least twice by Ali Khamenei to describe the reactions of journalists and social media users.
Several hours after this statement, Mizan, the official news agency of the judiciary, reported news citing the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office that a number of citizens had been summoned for commenting on the matter, received warnings, and for some, legal cases had been initiated.
The charges filed by the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office against media outlets, media activists, and journalists represent a recurring pattern following significant social events in Iran—similar to actions taken in April this year following the IRGC’s missile and drone attack from Iranian territory against Israel. In early October of this year, after the second missile attack by the IRGC from Iranian soil against Israel, and at the end of October following Israel’s attack on military bases in Iran, the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office filed charges against at least 12 media outlets, journalists, and media activists.
The Chart of Press Suppression Rose During the First 100 Days of Pezeshkian’s Presidency
At the official start of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency, at least eight journalists and media activists were incarcerated in Iranian prisons. By the end of the hundredth day of Pezeshkian’s tenure in the executive branch in Iran, the number of imprisoned journalists and media activists had increased to ten.
During days, four journalists experienced temporary detention. Fatemeh Gholipour was arrested in Tabriz, security forces apprehended Fardin Mostafayi in Saqez, and azhdar Piri was arrested in Karaj, while Reza Valizadeh was detained in Tehran.
During this period, prison sentences issued against four journalists and media activists were also enforced. Saeedeh Shafiee, Foad Sadeghi, and Mustafa Nemat were transferred to Evin Prison in Tehran after their arrests, while Jina Modares Gorji was taken to Sanandaj Prison to serve her sentence.
In the second week of his presidency over the executive branch of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian agreed to the request from the Tehran Association of Journalists to “withdraw complaints filed by government institutions against media personnel.” The new ministers of Oil and Education also announced that complaints which had previously been registered by their ministries against Iranian journalists and media outlets would be retracted.
Mohammad Reza Aref, the Vice President, also emphasized in a circular sent to the subordinates of the executive branch that “no official or governmental entity has the right to file complaints against any journalist or media outlet without the approval and review of the government’s information working group.”
Despite this, during the first hundred days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency, authorities, organizations, and state companies not only failed to retract many of their previous complaints against journalists and media outlets, but also registered new complaints against media personnel in Iran.
During this period, at least 38 new legal cases were filed against media outlets and journalists, with more than 50 percent (20 cases) of these complaints originating from governmental entities. The Tehran Prosecutor’s Office, Cyber Police, medical universities across the country, IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), companies under the Ministry of Oil, and the ministries of Culture, Economy, and Roads and Urban Development registered the highest number of complaints against media and journalists.
In those hundred days, the Secretary of the Cabinet under Masoud Pezeshkian filed a complaint against Hirsh Saidian, the governor of Shush filed a complaint against Mehdi Al-Kasir, Khatam Hospital in Iranshahr maintained its complaint against Sheida Hosseinzadeh and Mohammad Yasin Jalalzadeh, the case of Leila Mergen was brought back to the court by the complaint of the CEO of Bidboland Refinery, a new complaint was lodged by the Ministry of Culture against Hadi Kasai Zadeh, an arrest order was issued against Marzieh Hosseini following a complaint by the Ministry of Economy, Rahim Hezarian was summoned to court due to a complaint by Ahvaz University of Medical Sciences, the governor’s office and several other state institutions filed complaints against Hassan Abbasi, the state-owned Oxin Khuzestan Steel Company filed a complaint against Javad Monabi, and the University of Medical Sciences of Kerman lodged a complaint against Nakisa Khadishi, among others.
Disruptions to Free Information Dissemination and the Development of Patterns of Suppressing Freedom of Expression
The examination of events and documented press cases during the first 100 days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency revealed that organized disruptions to free information continued, widespread restrictions against media outlets and journalists were reiterated, and the Islamic Republic developed patterns of suppressing freedom of expression in the country.
The imposition of limitations and disruptions in the professional activities of journalists by government officials and institutions began in the early days of Pezeshkian’s presidency. A reporter and cameraman from Rokna news agency were unprofessionally and disrespectfully expelled from a meeting with Hossein Simayi, the Minister of Science, despite having received an initial invitation to attend.
The disruption of the professional activities of the Rokna reporter and cameraman occurred just a few days after several journalists announced on social media that their invitations to attend the introduction meeting for Sotudeh Hashemi, the Minister of Communications and Information Technology, had been canceled. These journalists wrote that the exclusion of journalists from this meeting was ordered by Mohammad Reza Aref, the First Vice President. This incident followed the controversial presence of Mohammad Reza Aref’s son at the introduction meeting for the Minister of Industry, Mines, and Trade.
In the final days of September, an explosion in the Maadanjo coal mine in Tabas killed at least 52 workers. Immediately following this event, which was the deadliest labor accident in the recorded history of Iranian mines, the judiciary, security, and governmental institutions of the Islamic Republic employed all their resources to disrupt accurate information dissemination and prevent the narrative of this tragic incident from being reported.
For days, as contradictory reports circulated regarding the number of workers killed in the Maadanjo coal mine, police and security forces stationed at the scene obstructed journalists from entering the mine site, mine managers refused to respond to media inquiries, many provincial and national officials were prohibited from speaking with the press regarding this incident, and one week later, the Attorney General of Iran stated, “We must wait for the investigator’s statement,” effectively banning commentary on this event.
From the very first hours following the incident at the Tabas mine, officials from the Masoud Pezeshkian government, along with the information council of this institution, in collaboration with the judiciary and security agencies of the Islamic Republic, attempted to present a false narrative of the event to absolve the government and regulatory bodies from responsibility for this tragic occurrence.
After the explosion at the Tabas coal mine, similar to several other significant and provocative events in the past, the security, judiciary, and propaganda entities of the Islamic Republic worked to amplify the official narrative of the regime and prevent independent narratives from becoming the dominant discourse among citizens.
he first hundred days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency coincided with the second anniversary of the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests. On the anniversary of these protests, the judiciary, security, and governmental bodies of the Islamic Republic focused their efforts on preventing the publication of reports regarding this event and disrupting independent information dissemination by exerting pressure on media leaders and policymakers of media and quasi-media outlets. In contrast to the previous year, when journalists faced more threatening phone calls, summons to judicial authorities, and temporary detentions, none of the Iranian press and news agencies were allowed to publish a report about this historic event on the anniversary of “Jina” protests.
During the first hundred days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency, several methods of disrupting the professional activities of journalists—previously implemented in limited cases by the security and judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic—were repeated more frequently. Investigations by the Defense of Free Flow of Information indicated that the Islamic Republic unlawfully cut off the SIM cards of several journalists and political activists due to their reporting on various events or for posting critical content on social media—without a judicial order. At the same time, some journalists and media activists were pressured by security and judicial authorities to delete their posts on social media; these unlawful actions indicate that the Islamic Republic is developing patterns of suppressing free information in Iran.
Moreover, during the first hundred days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency, there was no action taken to reopen the Iranian Association of Journalists, which had been shut down after the protests of 2009. Interference in the independence of the press continued through the complete control of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance over the main financial source of media (distribution of advertisements), and appointments in state-affiliated news agencies and media institutions further diminished hopes for structural changes to facilitate citizens’ access to reliable, accurate, and timely information.
Nevertheless, amid widespread restrictions and targeted disruptions in the professional activities of journalists, the head of the Government Information Council issued a statement inviting social media activists to cooperate; an action that can be described as an attempt by the government to expand its propaganda apparatus. Essentially, one of the key characteristics of the Iranian government’s propaganda machinery is its relentless effort to generate news content in major media and widely disseminate it through quasi-media and social media activists.
gal Sentences Against Journalists and Continuous Violations of Media Rights
Based on documented cases by the Defense of Free Flow of Information (DeFFI), during the first 100 days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency, political and press courts, or judges from the judiciary, issued indictments or prison sentences against journalists and media outlets in 32 separate cases.
Over the 100 days, seven journalists and media activists were sentenced to a total of 13 years, 3 months, and 16 days in prison, 70 lashes, and 26 million tomans in fines in eight distinct cases—under the application of Article 134 of the Islamic Penal Code, considering the last sentences issued.
During this period, Niloufar Hamadi and Elaheh Mohammadi were each sentenced to five years in prison by the Tehran Court of Appeals, Mahta Sadri was fined six million tomans in lieu of six months’ imprisonment, the Second Criminal Court of Saqez sentenced Mustafa Hamadi to ten months in prison and 70 lashes, and in another case, he was fined seven million tomans. Additionally, the Kurdistan Court of Appeals sentenced Jina Mardas Gorji to one year and four months in prison, and a sentence of 91 days against Manijeh Mo’azen was converted to a fine of ten million tomans.
During the first 100 days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency, the most frequently attributed charges against journalists and media outlets included “spreading falsehoods with the intent to disturb public opinion,” which occurred in 42 cases; “propaganda against the regime,” with 14 cases; and “conspiracy and collusion with the intent to act against national security,” which was cited in eight cases.
During these 100 days, the security and judicial bodies of the Islamic Republic violated the legal rights of journalists facing prosecution in at least 74 instances.
The holding of extralegal press trials in a non-public manner or without the presence of a jury was the most frequently violated right of journalists and media in this period, occurring in 46 cases. Other frequent violations included threats and disruptions to the professional activities of journalists and media in 9 cases, arbitrary detention of four journalists, obstruction of access to legal representation for four journalists after their arrest, four instances of illegal confiscation of personal and professional items without a legal order, and the assault of two other journalists, which were the most common violations of journalists’ rights in the first 100 days of Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency.